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OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE OF DOMESTIC 
AND FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES IN CHINA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Despite increasing attention paid to China’s enterprise reform since the late 1970s, relatively 
little is known about the performance of the reformed SOEs and newly formed private firms vis-
a-vis foreign firms in China. In this study, we examine the operational performance of domestic 
Chinese firms in various ownership categories versus foreign-invested enterprises based on two 
nation-wide Industrial Censuses conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics in 1998 and 2002. 
We found that domestic firms in the non-state sector and foreign-invested enterprises both 
performed better than the SOEs. Meanwhile, evidence shows that three categories of Chinese 
firms – the privately owned enterprises, the collectively owned enterprises, and the shareholding 
firms, had higher performance levels than the foreign-invested firms.  
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Reform in China began in the late 1970’s. Since then, China has embarked on a path of 
rapid economic growth. China’s GDP in 2003 reached US$1.3 trillion in absolute dollar terms, 
making it the sixth largest economy behind the United States, Japan, Germany, Britain and 
France. The breathtaking growth is believed to have come from two main sources, namely the 
reformed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), now in the non-state sector, and the foreign-invested 
enterprises (FIEs). Other than anecdotal accounts, however, few studies have empirically 
examined the relative performance of various types of firms in China on a scale large enough to 
present an overall picture.  
There are signs pointing to the increasing competitiveness of Chinese firms (Zeng & 
Williamson, 2003). By 2002, ten of them appeared on the list of Fortune’s largest global 500 
firms. For example, Haier, a former SOE and now a shareholding company with majority state 
ownership, achieved an annual sales of US$7 billion in 2001, catching up to that of US$10 
billion of Whirlpool. Haier not only had secured the domestic Chinese markets for major 
household appliances, but also had extended the competition to the US market by opening up a 
manufacturing facility in South Carolina with a capacity of half a million refrigerators in 2002. 
At the same time, Lenovo, a shareholding company headquartered in Beijing, outperformed Dell, 
Compaq, and IBM to become the largest computer manufacturer in Asia. Its recent acquisition of 
IBM’s personal computer business has made it the third-largest PC maker in the world. In the 
mobile phone market, domestic firms captured a 50 percent market share in 2003 at the expense 
of Motorola, Nokia, and Ericsson in China.  
On the other hand, there are signs pointing to performance discrepancy among Chinese 
firms. As the market-oriented reform continues, China moves towards a mixed economy, in 
which the SOEs, non-SOEs, and FIEs co-exist, although the state sector represents a decreasing 
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share in term of total output. Whereas SOEs accounted for 77.7% of China’s industrial output in 
1978, they accounted for only about 28.5% by 1998. Through the reform, the private sector 
flourished and gained momentum, but the state sector has not addressed effectively the old 
problems (Lin, Cai, & Li, 1998). It is important to know how the majority of firms in the non-
state sector, as opposed to such stars as Haier and Lenovo, compare with SOEs and FIEs.  
There is evidence of increasing commitment of multinational firms in China (Li, Qian, 
Lam, & Wang, 2000). By March 2003, a total of 432,820 foreign-invested enterprises had been 
approved to set up their operations in China, with a cumulative actual investment of US$461 
billion. After China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001, inflows of 
foreign investments in China increased rapidly. A total number of 8,624 FIEs were approved in 
the first quarter of 2003, an increase of 36.6% from the same period in 2002. The total realized 
foreign investment was US$13 billion, an increase of 56.7% from the same period in 2002. 
While the overall statistics on capital inflows are impressive, there is a lack of comprehensive 
understanding of the operational performance of multinational firms in China. The profitability 
of multinational firms with certain country origins is reportedly on the decline (Pan & Chi, 
1999). Further, it appears that multinational firms are abandoning their long-standing strategy of 
entering China through equity joint ventures (EJVs) (Vanhonacker, 1997). Thus it is important to 
evaluate the performance of FIEs as a whole in China, as well as to assess the relative advantages 
of EJVs and wholly owned subsidiaries (WOSs).   
The goal of this study is to examine and compare the operational performance of Chinese 
and foreign-invested enterprises in different ownership categories. We are particularly interested 
in knowing whether, after years of ownership reform, the former SOEs and new firms in the non-
state sector have gained competitiveness vis-a-vis foreign-invested enterprises, and will 
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formulate basic hypotheses addressing this research question. Our statistical tests rely on data 
obtained from two official large-scale surveys of firms conducted in China in 1998 and 2002. 
Because these surveys included tens of thousands of domestic and foreign firms, we are able to 
draw a general picture of the relative performance of these firms with a moderate degree of 
confidence. We believe that results of this study will be useful to a number of interested parties, 
including domestic Chinese firms, multinational firms inside or considering to enter China, as 
well as international investors looking for opportunities in the emerging markets. Our major 
finding – that some categories of Chinese firms have outperformed the foreign-invested 
enterprises – is counter-intuitive, and should prompt multinational firms to rethink about their 
own competitiveness in anticipation of more fierce competition ahead in the China market.  
THE OWNERSHIP REFORM AND DOMESTIC CHINESE ENTERPRISES 
The transition from a centrally planned economy towards a market-oriented economy has 
been a gigantic economic, political, and social experiment in China in the past quarter of a 
century. The reform of state-owned enterprises is at the center of this transition. The first wave of 
reform was for the state to delegate power to SOEs and permit them to retain part of the profits. 
This reform was carried out from 1978 to 1986. Due to increased autonomy and external 
competitive pressures, most SOEs improved their efficiency. However, deep-rooted problems 
remained. Then, between 1987 and 1996, the attention was shifted to transforming the operating 
mechanisms of those enterprises. Some SOEs began to adopt the corporate structure and 
management systems of Western corporations. From 1997, the issue of ownership reform was 
brought into the limelight. Privatization of SOEs and other means of reform were formally 
permitted and implemented.   
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The ownership reform gathered its pace in the late 1990s because the Chinese 
government found it increasingly harder to keep the SOEs afloat. In 1998, for instance, the state 
sector required a government subsidy of 150 billion yuan, or US$18.3 billion (O’Neill, 1999). 
More and more people started to believe that state ownership was the root cause of all the ills of 
SOEs, and that a well-thought-out ownership structure and management system would save these 
firms. From a more practical perspective, the central government was forced to allow the SOEs 
to raise the needed capital from non-state sources, thus opening the door to privatization. By 
2002, the central government had adopted the policy of “grasping the large and releasing the 
small.” Under this policy, the government retained direct control over some largest SOEs and 
infused additional capital in a hope to make these consolidated industrial enterprises more 
competitive. Meanwhile, the state has relinquished the small and medium-sized SOEs to the non-
state sector through equity sales, auctions, management buyouts, employee shareholder options, 
and other means.  
SOEs have been transformed into three major types of new ownership. The first category 
is shareholding enterprises. Ownership of these firms is open to all parties, including the state, 
the employees, and private investors. This is the basic form of modern corporations in the West. 
To ensure the plurality of shareholders, the Chinese government requires a shareholding 
company to have a minimum of five stockholders, which may or may not include the state, with 
no maximum limit. The ultimate goal is to turn the SOEs into companies with modern ownership 
and management systems. When these SOEs become profitable and attractive to private 
investors both in China and abroad, they will go for public listing in the stock markets. Many of 
these enterprises have already been listed on the stock exchanges of Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong 
Kong, and even New York.  
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The second category is limited liability firms. Ownership of these firms still lies in the 
hands of the state, but the state allows them to have a higher level of autonomy. The state is no 
longer its unlimited creditor. If the firm suffers from unrecoverable losses, the state may let it go 
bankrupt. This type of reform forces the SOEs to be separated from the state and become 
independent business entities. They were not turned into shareholding firms, either because there 
has not been enough capital from the private sources, or because the state wants to keep these 
enterprises in particular segments and does not intend to privatize them entirely. Even though the 
enterprise is still state-owned, the state refrains from giving direct orders on managerial and 
operational issues (Nee & Matthews, 1996). Thus we treat these firms as non-SOEs.  
The last category is privatized SOEs. The ownership of these firms is now privately 
controlled. In other words, the state has sold these former SOEs to private investors, which may  
or may not include managers and employees of the firm, at a price. Typically they have been 
transformed from smaller SOEs. Whether this type of reform, especially when done through 
management buyouts (MBOs), should be carried out on a larger scale and applied to larger 
SOEs, is under hot debate in the Chinese society.1   
PERFORMANE OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN FIRMS IN CHINA 
Domestic Firms versus Foreign-Invested Enterprises 
Reform and open-door policy are two backbones of Chinese economic growth in the past 
quarter of a century. Whereas reform, especially ownership reform since the late 1990s, has 
caused some fundamental changes to the domestic Chinese firms internally, the astounding 
increase in the inflow of foreign direct investments (FDI) facilitated these changes externally, as 
well as reshaped the competitive landscape of the China market as a whole. By 2003, the amount 
of FDI intake was well above US$ 50 billion.  
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While researchers have examined performance of foreign-invested firms in China (e.g. 
Pan, Li, & Tse, 1999; Luo & Peng, 1999), they have seldom done so in comparison with 
domestic Chinese firms. The lack of large-scale empirical investigation into the relative 
performance of domestic and foreign-invested firms in China caused controversies about the 
effect of FDI in China on the competitiveness of Chinese firms. Some scholars started to express 
concerns over the negative impact of FDI on Chinese firms and industries in recent years. Huang 
(2003), for instance, held that the flourish of FDI has been achieved at the sacrifice of China’s 
private sector. This view is being shared by an increasing number of scholars and practitioners. 2 
Behind such concerns is the conventional belief that domestic Chinese firms are at a 
significant competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis multinational firms. This view has intuitive 
appeals, and is supported by numerous cases in the early days of economic reform and open-door 
policy. Thus even though it is widely know that multinational firms face a “liability of 
foreignness”, i.e. having to incur higher costs than local firms (Hymer, 1976), in a foreign 
country, people had no doubt that the performance levels of domestic and foreign firms in China 
were not comparable to each other. Twenty years later, however, the answer is no longer 
straightforward. On the one hand, many Chinese firms have made progress through the reform 
and by directly competing with the multinationals. On the other hand, multinational firms should 
also have made progress by accumulating local knowledge and host-country experience (Luo & 
Peng, 1999; Steensma & Lyles, 2000). In fact, a brief survey of some major theories in 
economics, organization, and strategic management suggests that the analysis can be rather 
complicated. We discuss four relevant perspectives below. As Table 1 shows, each of them 
emphasizes a different factor in explaining firm competitiveness. 
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Table 1. Relative Advantages of SOEs, Non-SOEs, and FIEs 
 
Agency theory. Understandably, agency theory is a perspective that is closely related to 
the logic of ownership reform. Traditional agency theory focuses on the agency problem that 
typically exists in the private sector due to the separation of ownership and control (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). The problem is especially severe in modern corporations, where the principals 
lack the motivation to monitor the agents because of a dispersed ownership structure (Demsetz, 
1983). In the case of a state-owned enterprise, although ownership is not dispersed, the 
“principal” becomes the state, represented by bureaucrats from different governmental 
organizations and at different levels. These bureaucrats, themselves “agents” of the state, lack 
accountability and enough incentives to closely monitor SOE managers (Qian, 1996), as they are 
not adequately rewarded or penalized in accordance with the performance of the SOEs (Ma & 
Young, 2001). Thus ownership by all of the people becomes ownership by none of the people 
(Perkins, 1994). The ownership reform and the privatization of SOEs were aimed at changing 
this situation by reducing agency costs, channeling private wealth as capital for firm growth, and 
introducing corporate and private investors who will make the managers more accountable.    
Agency theory also has important implications for multinational firms, particularly for 
their overseas operations. It has been argued that the headquarters-foreign subsidiary relationship 
of a multinational firm resembles a principal-agency structure (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994). The 
agency problem exists because there are goal incongruence and information asymmetries 
Key Factors State-Owned 
Enterprises 
Non-SOEs/ 
Reformed SOEs 
Foreign-Invested 
Enterprises 
Agency Costs High Low Low-Medium 
Transaction Costs High Low Low-Medium 
Resources/Capabilities Medium Low High 
Legitimacy Medium Medium Medium 
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between the headquarters and the subsidiaries located in a host country (Roth & O’Donnell, 
1996). For example, subsidiary managers may have specialized local knowledge that is not 
shared by managers at the headquarters, and may develop their own strategic priorities 
independent of corporate-level policies (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). Thus monitoring behavior 
and evaluating performance become a difficult task for the multinational firms, especially for 
their subsidiaries in China, because of opportunism and low trust in the local business 
environment. As a result, many multinational firms have to place their China subsidiaries under 
direct monitoring by the headquarters, thus limiting the strategic flexibility at the subsidiary level.     
Transaction cost theory. In a modern enterprise, capital, technology, skills, and assets of 
various kinds come from different sources. The operation of the enterprise consists of various 
transactions among owners, employees, clients, and business partners (Williamson, 1985). Each 
party is seeking to maximize its own utility, and constantly looking for better opportunities. 
Transaction costs theory proposes that enterprises exist because they can handle transactions 
more efficiently than through the market mechanism. In light of this theory, SOEs are inefficient 
because they include within the organization transactions that can be better handled by the 
market. For example, large SOEs undertake policy burdens such as retaining redundant workers 
and providing welfare benefits (Lin & Tan, 1999), and therefore are encouraged to diversify and 
grow into a mini-society by having their own schools and hospitals. The reform of SOEs hinges 
on delineating what SOEs should do internally and externally. Through the reform, the more 
efficient forms of organization will gradually drive out the inefficient SOEs.  
Transaction cost theory and its extension in the international area, internalization theory, 
suggest that it is more efficient (less costly) for a firm to use hierarchies rather than market 
intermediaries to serve a foreign country (Beamish & Banks, 1987; Buckley & Casson, 1976). In 
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an emerging market such as China, foreign-invested enterprises have to deal with market 
imperfections, just like local firms, and sometimes even more so. For instance, they have to 
develop country-specific assets in an environment where uncertainty level is high, and deal with 
local suppliers and buyers where opportunistic behavior is common. On the other hand, FIEs 
enjoy an advantage over local firms in the form of an internal market within their multinational 
corporate networks (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990), although this may in turn increase their internal 
transaction costs due to such factors as large geographic distances and higher demand on 
information processing.  
Resource/capability perspectives. These perspectives attribute competitiveness to the 
resource endowment and internal capabilities of the firm (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Wernerfelt, 
1984). Resources must be rare, valuable, imperfectly imitable, and non-substitutable in order for 
a firm to reap economic rents (Barney, 1991). Because of the short history of China’s market 
economy, Chinese firms generally have not developed such resources, or unique competences, 
which will help confer a competitive advantage. In contrast, FIEs are able to utilize the 
ownership advantages of their parent firms in competing with local firms (Dunning, 1981). 
These may include proprietary assets such as technological know-how and brand names, 
managerial practices and organizing routines, and strong corporate cultures. Furthermore, 
multinational firms can gradually develop host-country-specific knowledge through learning 
from local partners and competitors (Delios & Beamish, 2001), thus enlarging the competence 
gap between foreign and local firms. 
On the other hand, while foreign-invested firms in China typically enjoy a resource or 
capability-based advantage over local firms, the latter may have access to some “network 
resources” not shared by the former. For instance, research has long regarded guanxi as a key 
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source of competitive advantage in the Chinese context (Tsang, 1998). Although it is argued that 
personal guanxi is more important to private firms than to state-owned enterprises, this is only 
true because SOEs have more formal and official network resources than private firms (Peng & 
Luo, 2000). A notable aspect of such resources is SOE managers’ connections to the central 
ministries (Shenkar, 1990). Overall, one can argue that while domestic Chinese firms lag behind 
FIEs in terms both resources and competences, some Chinese firms, especially SOEs, also enjoy 
unique network resources, along with associated reduction in transaction costs, that may bring 
them a competitive advantage vis-à-vis the multinationals.    
Institutional theory. Many phenomena that could not be explained by rational economic 
models exist because of various institutional forces at work (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977). Institutional theory emphasizes the role of isomorphism in shaping firm 
behavior. A firm that conforms to the formal and informal rules, cultural norms, and implicit 
assumptions of the society is expected to earn legitimacy and social capital, thus able to ensure 
its own survival, even though it may not be organized in the most efficient way from the 
economic perspectives (Scott, 1995). In a transition economy such as China, socialist values and 
traditions form part of the formal rules through government directives in economic activities, as 
well as part of the informal rules by influencing managerial practices and routines. Thus, for 
example, retaining an unnecessarily large workforce might be seen as a firm’s contribution to the 
attainment of the central or local government’s economic goals. A firm that conforms to such an 
expectation might be rewarded by being granted access to bank loans and other financial 
resources, although from a transaction cost perspective, the firm may be close to bankruptcy. In 
this tradition, SOEs clearly enjoy more legitimacy than their counterparts in the various non-state 
sectors, and thus are able to sustain themselves despite obvious economic inefficiencies.  
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In a transition economy, however, the rules of the game (North, 1990) are gradually 
changing, and the old routines being deinstitutionalized. New institutional rules and forces 
compete with the old ones to become the dominant voice of the society. One such force is the 
norms of reform, entrepreneurial growth, and profit maximization among firms in the private 
sector. Another force is professional management and global standard represented by foreign-
invested firms. Institutional theory suggests that, facing multiple and sometimes conflicting 
demands, each firm is likely to choose to conform to the ones that best suit its own interests 
(Oliver, 1991). As it stands now, each group of firms – SOEs, non-SOEs, and FIEs – is 
consistent with some institutional demands but not with some others. The SOEs still have 
substantial support from the government but are under increasing pressures to reform. The non-
SOEs are gaining acceptance but in many instances habitually disadvantaged in the Chinese 
economy and society (Nee, 1992). The multinational firms, as a vehicle that brought advanced 
technology and management skills to China as well as contributed to the economic growth of this 
country, have generally enjoyed legitimacy. On the other hand, their popularity in the society is 
declining as China becomes more and more open to the world economy, and as Chinese firms 
seeking growth face increasing competition from the multinationals. The FIEs also suffer from 
the conflicting demands caused by incompatible institutional rules of their home and host 
countries (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Sometimes local legitimacy can only 
be achieved at the cost of operational efficiency within the multinational firm system (Westney, 
1993).   
Summary. The above survey covers some major theoretical perspectives that are 
commonly used in a transition economy context (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Meyer 
& Peng, 2005). Although Table 1 has suggested some directions for analysis, it would be 
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premature to reach clear-cut conclusions as to the relative advantages and performance of the 
three broad categories of firms in China based on any single perspective listed here. Generally 
speaking, SOEs incur higher transaction and agency costs and are the least efficient 
organizations. Non-SOEs, including reformed former SOEs, have corrected many of the 
problems associated with the SOEs. They lack the same support and access to resources, 
however, as their SOE counterparts. FIEs are organized after their parents – some of them being 
the most efficient and resourceful organizations in the world. But they encounter unique 
problems in an environment far away from their home countries. Combining these various 
perspectives and considerations, we make the following preliminary predictions: 
Hypothesis 1: On average, firms in the non-state sectors perform better than state-
owned enterprises in China. 
 
Hypothesis 2: On average, foreign-invested enterprises perform better than 
domestic Chinese firms. 
 
Equity Joint Ventures and Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries 
A long-standing theme in international management is the advantages of equity joint 
ventures in comparison to wholly owned subsidiaries. The success of EJVs in China has been 
well documented (Beamish, 1993; Luo, 1997; Pan et al., 1999). In recent years, however,  the 
trend is being reversed. More and more multinational firms have chosen to enter China with 
WOSs in stead of EJVs because of problems associated with the latter. The number of newly 
established WOSs exceeded that of the new EJVs for the first time in 1997 (Child & Tse, 2001). 
Among other things, EJVs are plagued by internal conflicts, are hard to sustain, and cannot 
guarantee access to an administratively divided national market (Walsh, Wang, & Xin, 1999; 
Vanhonacker, 1997). The business media in China are full of reports on the “equity 
unilateralization” by the foreign partners in Sino-foreign joint ventures. Even such pioneer in 
 
 
 
15  
 
EJV experiments as Matsushita has bought up the equity stakes of its Chinese partners and 
formed its wholly owned China headquarters. Such reports, however, are mostly anecdotal and 
yet to be confirmed through statistical analysis. 
Many theories can provide insights into the relative performance of EJVs and WOSs in 
the Chinese economy today. We rely on the same set of perspectives in Table 1 to make our 
prediction. Although not widely used for this purpose, agency theory suggests that agency costs 
are probably higher in EJVs because more principals (parents) and agents (managers 
representing these parents) are involved, and hence higher chances for goal incongruence 
between partners, more complicated task for monitoring behavior, and increased difficulty in 
evaluating performance (Luo, Shenkar, & Nyaw, 2001). The transaction cost – internalization 
perspective, on the other hand, generally favors the EJV as a more efficient mode of organizing 
in transition economies, mainly because this mode reduces transaction costs related to imperfect 
market institutions (Meyer, 2001; Meyer & Peng, 2005).  
The resource and capability perspectives suggest that compared to a WOS, an EJV may 
benefit from both parents and thus enjoy a certain level of advantage. Combining complementary 
resources and capabilities has been an important rationale for joint ventures formation. A typical 
joint venture in transition economies consists of distinctive contributions made by both the 
foreign and local parents – usually technological and managerial skills from the foreign parent, 
and access to distributional channels and markets from the local partner. The success of an EJV 
often lies in its capacity to absorb knowledge transferred from its foreign parent (Lane, Salk, & 
Lyles, 2001; Lyles & Salk, 1996), as well as its ability to learn from the local business 
community (Makino & Delios, 1996). In this sense, an EJV has more resources and opportunities 
for growth and success than a WOS.  
 
 
 
16  
 
Lastly, institutional theory provides insights into this issue from a non-efficiency 
perspective. This theory suggests that having a local partner in the host country is an effective 
mechanism for lowering the risk of institutional conflicts between a foreign subsidiary and the 
host country institutions (Xu, Pan, & Beamish, 2004). On the other hand, this research also 
suggests that by having two partners within the same organization, there will be a higher 
probability of intra-organizational conflict between the partners who may represent conflicting 
institutional rules and norms. One may argue that the need for a local partner is higher in the 
early stage of a firm’s entry into a host market (Peng, 2003); as the firm learns more about the 
institutional environment of the host country, the need may be gradually reduced. As some 
Japanese firms just found out in the recent anti-Japanese demonstrations, however, being in 
China for a quarter of a century is not enough for them to remove their liability of foreignness 
(Zaheer, 1995).     
The above analysis does not seem to offer a definitive conclusion. Agency and 
transaction cost theories lead to conflicting propositions. The choice between EJVs and WOSs, 
according to these perspectives,  represents a tradeoff between lower transaction costs in an 
underdeveloped market and higher agency costs in a two or multi-party hierarchy. Exactly how 
much China’s institutional environment has changed towards the reduction of transaction costs, 
so that a WOS is preferable over an EJV, is perhaps an empirical issue. Institutional theory itself 
provides mixed insights as to which mode of entry may lead to better results. Only the resource 
and capability perspectives are generally in favor of one mode over the other. For the purpose of 
statistical testing, we make the following proposition:  
Hypothesis 3: On average, equity joint ventures perform better than wholly owned 
subsidiaries in China.  
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METHOD 
We rely on two large-sample surveys conducted by the Chinese National Bureau of 
Statistics to test our hypotheses. In recent years, the Bureau has conducted annual Industrial 
Censuses, which cover all enterprises operating in China, both domestic and foreign, that had 
annual sales revenues of US$25,000 (RMB 200,000 yuan) or above in the past year. In other 
words, they aim to include all manufacturing firms except very small businesses. By law all 
businesses in China are required to cooperate in the censuses conducted by the Bureau. The 
Bureau started to engage in commercial activities in recent years through its commercial arms. 
Our data were purchased from one of these firms, Huatongren, which is one of the leading 
providers of business information in China.  
For space limitation, we only used the 1998 and 2002 censuses – the first and last ones 
for which we have data. 1998 marks the twenties anniversary of China’s reform and open-door 
policies, and was one year after China started to accelerate the ownership reform (Huang, 2003). 
From these two samples, we excluded firms that were established in 1998 and 2002, respectively, 
to make sure that all firms had had at least one year of operation. We also excluded firms 
classified as agricultural manufacturers. Further, we deleted cases with obviously inaccurate 
numbers (e.g. negative sales and negative total assets). There were roughly 140,000 and 160,000 
enterprises, respectively, in each of these two samples. Research using this data source has 
appeared in a number of academic journals (Buckley, Clegg, & Wang, 2002; Pan et al., 1999; 
Perkins, 1996). As Chow (1993) pointed out, statistics reported by the Bureau are largely 
accurate and internally consistent for empirical analysis.  
We employed multiple-way ANOVA to test hypotheses 1 and 2, using a post-hoc 
procedure to derive pair-wise mean differences and their corresponding significance levels. The 
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dependent variables in these tests are three absolute measures, Profit, Sales, and Assets, and 
three profitability ratios, Return on Sales (ROS), Return on Assets (ROA), and Profit per 
Employee (PPE)3. The ANOVA tests were conducted among the following groups: State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), Collectively Owned Enterprises (COEs)4, Shareholding Enterprises (SHEs),  
Limited Liability Enterprises (LLEs), Privately Owned Enterprises (POEs), and Foreign-Invested 
Enterprises (FIEs), with age, size, location, and industry as control variables. The control 
variables were treated as fixed factors along with ownership (hence multiple-way ANOVA). 
Therefore, they are “control variables” only in a conceptual sense. Firm age is measured in years. 
We evenly divided all firms into four size groups based on the number of employees. Thus firm 
size is an interval scale ranging from 1 to 4, with 4 representing the top 25th percentile of firms. 
Location is a dummy variable coded 1 if a firm is located in a coastal province, and 0 if 
otherwise. We also included over four hundred 4-digit Chinese SICs to control for industry fixed 
effects. The age, size, and location variables and many of the industry dummies are significant 
but not reported here.  
We then followed the above format to test hypothesis 3, with equity joint ventures (EJVs) 
and wholly owned subsidiaries (WOSs) as the classification groups. Although there are only two 
groups involved, we chose multiple-way ANOVA, instead of a simple t-test, because we wanted 
to “control” for the effects of age, size, location, and industry segments.  
RESULTS 
Table 2 lists in each cell the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum, in that 
order, of the corresponding dependent variable, for the corresponding group. All F-tests are 
significant at the p<0.001 level. Detailed pair-wise results from post-hoc analysis (Tamhane’s T2 
in SPSS) are listed in Appendix 1. We discuss the performance of each category of firms below. 
 
 
 
19  
 
The SOEs. In 1998 (Table 2a), the SOEs had the lowest average profit level ($1,350 US 
equivalent) among all groups of firms. In term of profitability, they had a negative and the lowest 
ROS (-0.246). They were the only group of firms that had a negative ROA (-0.023) and a 
negative PPE (-$206). By 2002 (Table 2b), their average profit level had risen to $298,000, 
surpassing those of the COEs and POEs. Yet their profitability ratios remained to be the lowest 
among all firms (-0.159, -0.008, and $16). The number of SOEs included in the two surveys 
declined from 43,513 in 1998 to 22,737 in 2002, reflecting the changing reality in the Chinese 
economy. 
***************************** 
Insert Tables 2a and 2b about here 
***************************** 
 
The Non-SOEs. The largest group of non-SOEs in 1998, the COEs, did surprisingly well 
in terms of the profitability ratios (0.012, 0.103, and $844), and their relative standing remained 
largely unchanged in 2002 (0.021, 0.101, and $1,230), although their number declined from 
43,415 to 24,236. The SHEs had the highest average profit ($338,000) but a negative ROS (-
0.010) in 1998. Their ROA (0.050) and PPE ($841) were relatively high. The ROS turned 
positive (0.017) in 2002. It appears that many former SOEs had been transformed into LLEs and 
POEs by 2002, with the numbers of these two categories of firms rose substantially to 19,892 
and 44,727, respectively. The POEs did rather well in 1998 in term of profitability. They had the 
highest ROS and ROA ratios (0.030 and 0.082, respectively) in 2002 as well, although they 
remained to be the smallest in size ($3,131,000 in sales and $2,269,000 in assets). The LLEs had 
the lowest performance among the non-SOEs in both years. 
The FIEs. In 1998, the FIEs did not appear to have any significant advantage compared to 
local firms other than the SOEs. In 2002, they achieved a moderate increase in number (from 
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24,902 to 32,751), the highest profit level ($664,000), and the highest PPE ($2,200). The ROS 
and ROA ratios (0.007 and 0.046, respectively) both improved over those of 1998 (-0.030 and 
0.023, respectively) but still lag behind some groups of domestic firms. Overall, there is no clear 
indication that the FIEs performed better than most Chinese firms. 
Summarizing the above results, combined with a careful examination of the significance 
levels for pair-wise group mean differences in Appendices 1a and 1b, we can draw the following 
conclusions. First, the SOEs had the lowest performance levels, in terms of the profitability 
ratios, in both 1998 and 2002. Thus hypothesis 1 is supported. Second, compared to the non-
SOEs, the FIEs performed better than the LLEs only, in terms of ROS and ROA, in 1998. In 
2002, the situation was largely unchanged, although the difference between the FIEs and SHEs 
on ROA turned insignificant (Appendix 1b). Overall, there are no clear signs supporting 
hypothesis 2. On the contrary, it appears that three categories of Chinese firms, the POEs, COEs, 
and SHEs, performed better than the FIEs to different extents.  
 Table 3 shows the results of mean comparisons between the EJVs and WOSs. It appears 
that the EJVs performed better than the WOSs on certain dimensions. In 1998, the EJVs had 
higher assets (p<0.05) and higher ROA (p<0.001). In 2002, the EJVs stayed ahead of the WOSs 
on these two measures (p<0.001 for both assets and ROA) as well as on ROS (p<0.05). 
Differences on other measures are largely insignificant. Hypothesis 3 thus received some support. 
It should be noted that while the numbers of both EJVs and WOS increased from 1998 to 2002, 
the latter rose much more rapidly, in both absolute number and percentage.  
********************** 
Insert Tables 3 about here 
********************** 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
That domestic Chinese firms are becoming increasingly competitive vis-a-vis 
multinational firms has received much anecdotal evidence in media and industry reports. An 
Asian Wall Street Journal article described China’s consumer-goods market as characterized by 
fierce competition and eroding profit margins for small and medium foreign investors, especially 
because their local Chinese counterparts are gaining competitiveness. The author cited experts 
from Merrill Lynch and McKinsey to conclude that China is the most competitive (consumer-
goods) market in the world (Chang, 2002). Similarly, in a large survey conducted by Fortune 
(China) in 2002, 83 percent of the responding foreign firms considered increasing competition as 
a major challenge facing their firms, high over such institutional factors as governmental 
relations, labor management, and policy uncertainty (Jiang, 2002).     
Our study provides large-sample statistics to confirm these informal reports. Three major 
findings are obtained from our data analysis and are worth further discussion. The first major 
finding is that the reformed SOEs and newly formed private firms have become rather 
competitive compared to the SOEs. After twenty years’ reform, the various types of firms into 
which the former SOEs were transformed – the SHEs, LLEs, and POEs – have achieved 
evidently higher performance levels than the un-reformed SOEs. Although this finding itself is 
not surprising, this is perhaps  the first time the positive profit outcome of reform in China is 
reported on such a large scale.  
The second major finding, that many categories of domestic Chinese firms – the SHEs, 
COEs, and POEs – achieved higher performance than the FIEs, is counter-intuitive and falls 
beyond many people’s expectation. Reform and open-door policies began at the same time – 
after 1978. Twenty years ago the performance difference between Chinese and foreign firms was 
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obvious. Since then, the domestic firms have made progress through reform and competition, as 
multinational firms gradually learned to cope with China’s unique institutional setting and 
competitive environment. While the majority of people in China are concerned about the 
competitive pressures on domestic firms brought about by the multinationals as a result of 
China’s entry into the WTO, our statistics show that such a concern is perhaps unwarranted. The 
only groups of domestic firms that lagged behind the FIEs in 2002 were the SOEs and LLEs. 
This result delivers a clear message, namely, ownership reform is the right way to go for the 
Chinese economy, and should help resolve the controversies on this issue in China since mid-
2004. 
Among the non-SOEs, we found the POEs and COEs to be the best performers, which is 
somewhat surprising, as one may expect the SHEs, the firms that most resemble modern 
corporations in a free economy, to be the leading enterprises in China. From an ownership 
perspective, however, the SHEs may still involve state equity, either in a majority or minority 
position. The SHEs and LLEs are the two categories of firms into which the larger SOEs were 
transformed. The state typically retains some ownership in these firms and exerts substantial 
influences in the post-reform era. As a result, agency problems such as insiders’ control and 
expropriation of minority interests are common among these firms (Dharwadkar, George, & 
Brandes, 2000, Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, & Bruton, 2002). As they are typically larger than the 
POEs, they may also be expected to share some policy burdens by the government, which causes 
inefficiencies. If we further consider the fact that some of their best physical and human assets 
had been separated or spun off to form joint ventures with multinational firms (Buck, Filatotchev, 
Nolan, & Wright, 2000), their disadvantages become clear. The POEs, although small, are tightly 
controlled by private owners and very much profit-oriented. It should not too surprising that they 
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had the highest ROS in both years. The advantages of COEs, which include numerous township-
village enterprises (TVEs), have been discussed extensively in the literature (e.g. Che & Qian, 
1998; Jin & Qian, 1998) and will not be repeated here.  
The last major finding of this study is that the EJVs are still leading the FIEs in terms of 
the profitability ratios. Despite the strategic change made by many multinational firms – 
incumbents as well as newcomers to China – to opt for wholly owned subsidiaries, the EJVs 
actually had higher performance, based on some measures, than the WOSs, and even more so in 
2002 than in 1998. This result, combined with the fact that the FIEs as a whole did not do better 
than the domestic Chinese firms, has important implications for multinational firms. It appears 
that multinational firms today still have a relatively high degree of liability of foreignness in 
China, and partnering with a local firm remains to be a good strategy to deal with this situation. 
In addition to the old argument that a local partner can bridge local knowledge, legitimacy, and 
consumers to the multinational firm, the higher competitiveness of Chinese firms found in this 
study suggests that local firms can make further contributions to the success of joint ventures, 
perhaps in terms of valuable resources and improved capabilities, and that the integration inside 
the EJVs today will be easier than ever before because of the progress local firms have made in 
the past two decades or so. 
Generally, we send a warning signal to multinational firms inside, or considering to enter, 
the China market. It seems that domestic Chinese firms are learning faster in the competition 
than the foreign firms. If this trend continues, not only the FIEs will lose ground in the domestic 
market, but also their parents may soon be confronted with a large number of competitors from 
China in the international market. The FIEs, of course, still have their traditional advantages in 
capital, technology, managerial practice, and brand reputation. Furthermore, FIEs had the highest 
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profit level per firm ($664,000) and the highest profit level per employee ($2,200) in 2002. With 
adequate financial resources and excellent training programs, multinational firms can attract, 
retain, and promote the best talents in China, further strengthening their competitive advantage in 
the quality of human resources. 
Finally, we note that this study has its limitations. Due to data availability, we used only 
the 1998 and 2002 Industrial Censuses information. Thus we missed the firms that failed or 
exited before 1998; the firms that are included for analysis may be winners of survival tests over 
years. This is a common limitation in research on firm performance, and we were not able to 
remove this problem. Also, we were not able to identify, among the non-SOEs, the firms that 
were transformed from former SOEs, and thus unable to assess the effect of ownership reform 
directly, or to conduct a longitudinal analysis. We hope that the inclusion of an age control, and 
the fact that our empirical analysis was based on nearly the population of firms in China at two 
different points of time, will make up for these deficiencies.  
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NOTES: 
                                                          
1 In the summer of 2004, Professor Larry H. P. Lang of the Chinese University of Hong Kong 
sparked a major controversy in China by charging China’s emerging class of entrepreneurs and 
professional managers of stealing state assets in the process of SOE reform and privatization. He 
argued that ownership reform has not strengthened the former SOEs, but instead is detrimental to 
public interests. In response, China’s elite entrepreneurs, allied with liberal economists, defended 
the reform as well as their own behavior fiercely. For many months the financial media were 
dominated by this national debate. Our study provides a partial answer to the controversy. 
 
2 For instance, a recent report on the current state of the Chinese automobile industry held that 
partnering with foreign manufacturers has made Chinese automakers highly dependent on 
foreign technology, because multinational firms would insist that the Chinese partner give up its 
R&D activities as a prerequisite for forming a joint venture.  
 
3 Although we refer to the PPE as a ratio, it is reported as the absolute profit amount per 
employee.  
 
4 Collectively owned enterprises were part of the planned economy in the pre-reform days. 
Although this form of ownership has been retained, today’s COEs are part of the market-oriented 
economy. They include, among others, China’s active township-village enterprises (TVEs).   
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Table 2a. Operational Performance of All Groups of Firms in 1998 
 
Note: Amounts are in thousand U.S. dollars for all measures except for the ratios. In each cell, 
the first number is the mean, the second row is the standard deviation, the third row is the 
minimum, and the fourth row is the maximum. 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
SOEs COEs SHEs LLEs POEs FIEs F-Test
1.35 102 338 193 84.1 214 F=32.19
4563 758 3046 4163 477 4802 P<0.001
-188734 -49667 -41535 -39459 -16887 -108087 
Profit 
697290 67016 189385 267936 27081 366954 
5872 3164 5765 8201 2253 7611 F=35.08
50910 12717 25642 39626 4330 36210 P<0.001
25 25 25 25 25 27 
Sales 
3599675 2033198 1191277 1535913 157273 3150485 F=38.16
12968 3094 8862 16916 1785 10256 P<0.001
113476 10680 41316 93756 3942 51638 
12 12 13 19 12 13 
Assets 
11300000 1133704 2236054 2847927 130134 3718626 F=228.16
-0.246 0.012 -0.010 -0.033 0.026 -0.030 P<0.001
1.560 0.208 1.680 0.387 0.132 0.364 
-97.300 -19.800 -167.000 -14.400 -5.730 -13.500 
ROS 
29.900 7.660 7.950 2.250 1.890 13.500 
-0.023 0.103 0.050 0.019 0.103 0.023 F=997.15
0.164 0.326 0.165 0.110 0.296 0.195 P<0.001
-7.830 -5.410 -1.190 -1.110 -1.200 -7.140 
ROA 
13.900 19.700 8.130 1.990 16.000 18.100 
-0.206 0.844 0.841 0.509 0.933 0.417 F=151.63
4.110 3.470 5.850 5.740 2.950 11.000 P<0.001
-161 -99 -36 -32 -26 -676 
PPE 
367 256 475 357 149 32 
N 43513 43415 12322 6164 9138 24902 
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Table 2b. Operational Performance of All Groups of Firms in 2002 
 
 
Note: Amounts are in thousand U.S. dollars for all measures except for the ratios. In each cell, 
the first number is the mean, the second row is the standard deviation, the third row is the 
minimum, and the fourth row is the maximum. 
 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
SOEs COEs SHEs LLEs POEs FIEs F-Test
Profit 298 190 627 430 129 664 
 6428 1485 7325 4754 599 7559 
 -61457 -4964 -52016 -134593 -9117 -91937 
 581536 128166 740330 382970 51591 669431 
F=28.54
P<0.001
Sales 9973 4194 11969 10813 3131 11487 
 98807 29583 79837 60857 7678 73414 
 25 25 25 25 25 25 
 6033311 3783528 4221264 2924314 475501 5666506 
F=32.38
P<0.001
Assets 18944 3526 15339 17540 2269 11451 
 164168 22211 98656 113036 6628 56683 
 13 12 28 12 14 13 
 9371782 2447658 7688434 6731044 482610 3703613 
F=37.42
P<0.001
ROS -0.159 0.021 0.017 -0.0006 0.030 0.007 
 1.120 0.375 0.307 0.715 0.292 0.350 
 -87.900 -42.600 -20.600 -69.200 -58.600 -23.800 
 11.800 2.040 3.560 43.200 2.100 22.400 
F=202.53
P<0.001
ROA -0.008 0.101 0.053 0.037 0.082 0.046 
 0.115 0.283 0.130 0.115 0.172 0.473 
 -5.490 -2.400 -4.330 -2.000 -2.270 -56.700 
 4.710 20.900 3.61 3.3 9.760 55.000 
F=298.51
P<0.001
PPE 0.016 1.230 1.360 1.470 1.140 2.200 
 5.490 3.700 5.650 35.700 4.100 17.600 
 -264 -128 -104 -149 -35 -221 
 334 116 223 4947 337 1926 
F=42.74
P<0.001
N 22737 24236 14836 19892 44727 32751 
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Table 3. Operational Performance of EJVs and WOSs 
 
Note: Amounts are in thousand U.S. dollars for all measures except for the ratios. In each cell, 
the first number is the mean, the second row is the standard deviation, the third row is the 
minimum, and the fourth row is the maximum. 
 
 Year 1998 Year 2002 
Dependent 
Variables 
EJVs WOSs F test EJVs WOSs F test
230  177 746 549  
5015  4286 8921 5098  
-108087  -30626 -91937 -86258  
Profit 
366953  315394 
F=0.73
P=0.394
669431 358390  
F=0.05
P=0.940
7618  7594 11317 11721  
35156  38471 66144 82441  
27  31 25 25  
Sales 
3150485  2196985 
F=2.91
P=0.088
4533160 5666506  
F=2.70
P=0.100
10705  9249 11703 11100  
52759  49016 54697 59325  
13  24 13 21  
Assets 
3718626  2478293 
F=5.24
P=0.022
3703612 3384195  
F=12.60
P<0.001
-0.033 -0.024 0.008 0.006  
0.395  0.278 0.379 0.304  
-13.542  -5.001 -23.830 -16.390  
ROS 
4.789  13.482 
F=0.12
P=0.727
22.443 5.220  
F=5.32
P=0.020
0.026  0.015 0.052 0.039  
0.196  0.191 0.421 0.535  
-3.075  -7.140 -2.471 -56.727  
ROA 
18.055  4.653 
F=26.86
P<0.001
55.043 9.681  
F=8.86
P<0.001
0.505  0.219 2.295 2.063  
12.188  7.724 15.130 20.467  
-676.022  -156.575 -221.266 -125.801  
PPE 
325.000  156.221 
F=0.58
P=0.445
1165.031 1925.589  
F=0.73
P=0.390
N 17360 7737 19120 13790  
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Appendix 1a. Pair-Wise Comparisons of Performance for Different Ownership Categories in 1998 
Ownership (I) Ownership (J) Mean Difference (I-J) 
  Profit Sales Assets ROS ROA PPE 
COE -101** 2758*** 9994*** -.259*** -.126*** -1.054*** 
SHE -338*** 139 4207*** -.236*** -.074*** -1.052*** 
LLE -187** -2277*** -3879** -.212*** -.042*** -.714*** 
POE -79*** 3676*** 11318*** -.273*** -.127*** -1.144*** 
State-Owned 
Enterprise 
(SOE) 
  
  FIE -213** -1709*** 2804*** -.215*** -.046*** -.633*** 
SOE 101*** -2758*** -9994*** .2594*** .126*** 1.054*** 
SHE -237*** -2618*** -5786*** .023 .052*** .001 
LLE -85 -5035*** -13873*** .046** .083*** .339*** 
POE 21*** 918*** 1324*** -.013*** -.0006 -.090 
Collectively 
Owned Enterprise 
(COE)  
  
  FIE -112 *** -4467*** -7189*** .043*** .079*** .421*** 
SOE 338*** -139 -4207*** .236*** .074*** 1.052*** 
COE 237*** 2618*** 5786*** -.023 -.052*** -.001 
LLE 151 -2416*** -8086*** .023 .031*** .338*** 
POE 258.59*** 3537*** 7111*** -.037 -.053*** -.092 
Shareholding 
Enterprise 
(SHE) 
  
  FIE 125*** -1848*** -1402* .020 .027*** .419*** 
SOE 187** 2277*** 3879** .212*** .042*** .714*** 
COE 85 5035*** 13873*** -.046*** -.083*** -.339*** 
SHE -151 2416*** 8086*** -.023 -.031*** -.338*** 
POE 107 5954*** 15197*** -.060*** -.084*** -.430*** 
Limited Liability 
Enterprise 
(LLE) 
  
  FIE -26 568 6683*** -.003 -.004 .081 
SOE 79*** -3676*** -11318*** .273*** .127*** 1.144*** 
COE -21*** -918** -1324*** .013*** .0006 .0903 
SHE -258*** -3537*** -7111*** .037 .053*** .0922 
LLE -107 -5954*** -15197*** .060*** .084*** .430*** 
Privately Owned 
Enterprise 
(POE) 
  
  FIE -133*** -5385*** -8513*** .057*** .080*** .511*** 
SOE 213*** 1709*** -2804*** .215*** .046*** .633*** 
COE 112*** 4467*** 7189*** -.043*** -.079*** -.421*** 
SHE -125** 1848*** 1402* -.020 -.027*** -.419*** 
LLE 26 -568 -6683*** .003 .004 -.081 
Foreign-Invested 
Enterprise 
(FIE) 
  
  
POE 133*** 5385*** 8513*** -.057*** -.080*** -.511*** 
Note: *** The mean difference is significant at the 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.10 level. 
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Appendix 1b. Pair-Wise Comparisons of Performance for Different Ownership Categories in 2002 
Ownership (I) Ownership (J) Mean Difference (I-J) 
  Profit Sales Assets ROS ROA PPE 
COE 100 5580*** 15044*** -.180*** -.109*** -1.213*** 
SHE -337*** -2205 3234 -.176*** -.062*** -1.339*** 
LLE -138 -978 1255 -.158*** -.046*** -1.456*** 
POE 161*** 6649*** 16310*** -.189*** -.091*** -1.128*** 
State-Owned 
Enterprise 
(SOE) 
  
  FIE -375*** -1732 7101** -.166*** -.055*** -2.185*** 
SOE -100 -5580*** -15044*** .180*** .109*** 1.213*** 
SHE -437*** -7786*** -11809*** .004 .047*** -.126 
LLE -239*** -6559*** -13788*** .022*** .063*** -.242 
POE 60*** 1069*** 1266*** -.008*** .018*** .084* 
Collectively 
Owned Enterprise 
(COE) 
  
  FIE -476*** -7312*** -7943** .014*** .054*** -.972*** 
SOE 337*** 2205 -3234 .176*** .062*** 1.339*** 
COE 437*** 7786*** 11809*** -.004 -.047*** .126 
LLE 198* 1226 -1978 .018** .016*** -.116 
POE 498*** 8855*** 13076*** -.012*** -.028*** .211*** 
Shareholding 
Enterprise 
(SHE) 
  
  FIE -38 473 3866*** .009*** .007 -.845*** 
SOE 138 978 -1255 .158*** .046*** 1.456*** 
COE 239*** 6559*** 13788*** -.022*** -.063*** .242 
SHE -198* -1226 1978 -.018** -.016*** .116 
POE 300*** 7628*** 15055*** -.031*** -.045*** .327 
Limited Liability  
Enterprise 
(LLE)  
  
  FIE -237*** -753 5845*** -.008 -.009** -.729 
SOE -161*** -6649*** -16310*** .189*** .091*** 1.128*** 
COE -60*** -1069*** -1266*** .008** -.018*** -.084* 
SHE -498*** -8855*** -13076*** .012*** .028*** -.211*** 
LLE -300*** -7628*** -15055*** .031*** .045*** -.327 
Privately Owned 
Enterprise 
(POE) 
  
  FIE -537*** -8381*** -9209*** .022*** .036*** -1.057*** 
SOE 375*** 1732 -7101*** .166*** .055*** 2.185*** 
COE 476*** 7312*** 7943*** -.014*** -.054*** .972*** 
SHE 38 -473 -3866*** -.009** -.007 .845*** 
LLE 237*** 753 -5845*** .008 .009** .729 
Foreign-Invested 
Enterprise 
(FIE) 
  
POE 537*** 8381*** 9209*** -.022*** -.036*** 1.057*** 
Note: *** The mean difference is significant at the 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.10 level. 
 
 
